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New insights? 
Heisenberg’s visit to Niels Bohr in 1941 and the Bohr letters1 
 
The documents recently released by the Niels Bohr Archive do not, in an unambiguous way, 
solve the enigma of what happened during the critical brief discussion between Bohr and 
Heisenberg in 1941 which so upset Bohr and made Heisenberg so desperate. But they are 
interesting, they show what Bohr remembered 15 years later. What Heisenberg remembered 
was already described by him in his memoirs “Der Teil und das Ganze”. The two descriptions 
are complementary, they are not incompatible. The two famous physicists, as Hans Bethe 
called it recently, just talked past each other, starting from different assumptions. They did not 
finish their conversation. Bohr broke it off before Heisenberg had a chance to complete his 
intended mission.  
 
Heisenberg and Bohr had not seen each other since the beginning of the war in 1939. In the 
meantime, Heisenberg and some other German physicists had been drafted by Army 
Ordnance to explore the feasibility of a nuclear bomb which, after the discovery of fission and 
of the chain reaction, could not be ruled out. How real was this theoretical possibility? By 
1941 Heisenberg, after two years of intense theoretical and experimental investigations by the 
drafted group known as the “Uranium Club”, had reached the conclusion that the construction 
of a nuclear bomb would be feasible in principle, but technically and economically very 
difficult. He knew in principle how it could be done, by Uranium isotope separation or by 
Plutonium production in reactors, but both ways would take many years and would be beyond 
the means of Germany in time of war, and probably also beyond the means of Germany’s 
adversaries. (When Heisenberg heard about the Hiroshima bomb, almost four years later 
while interned in Farm Hall, at first he could not believe it.)  Heisenberg and von Weizsäcker 
were very glad about this result. It meant that they were spared a difficult moral decision. 
They were able to concentrate on the construction of a reactor for power production, a goal 
easily compatible with their value system. If a bomb would have been within reach, how 
could they have avoided being forced to build it without sacrificing their lives as saboteurs? 
But what about the long-range future? Was the construction of nuclear weapons unavoidable? 
Was it conceivable that the then small community of nuclear physicists could come to an 
agreement not to work on bomb construction? Heisenberg and his friend and colleague von 
Weizsäcker decided that it would be helpful to have discussions with Bohr, their father figure. 
In a kind of naiveté they did not realize that their old cordial relationship with Bohr had been 
affected by the events of the war. For Bohr his old friend Heisenberg was now a 
representative of an enemy country, of the occupying power of his native Denmark, whose 
remarks would have to be looked upon with suspicion.  
 
                                                        
1 Klaus Gottstein was a member of the Max Planck Institute for Physics from 1950 to 1970 under the 
directorship of Werner Heisenberg. For several years he was head of the experimental division of the 
Institute. In 1969 he asked Heisenberg about his visit to Bohr in 1941, and Heisenberg told him. 
Immediately afterwards K.G. dictated into a recorder what Heisenberg had said. This record and its 
transcription are still available. 
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Heisenberg managed to make the trip to Copenhagen in September 1941, using the 
opportunity of a scientific conference arranged by the German Culture Institute in 
Copenhagen, boycotted by Bohr. Heisenberg spent several days in Copenhagen and probably 
saw Bohr several times, in Bohr’s office, in Bohr’s home and on a walk. On the latter 
occasion when there was no danger of being overheard by the Gestapo, Heisenberg undertook 
to broach the questions which were the real reasons for his trip.  
 
What is written above is the gist of what Heisenberg wrote and what he explained to friends 
and colleagues when questioned. But his explanations were not accepted everywhere, 
particularly not by some of his British and U.S. colleagues and by some later writers who 
were convinced that Heisenberg did all he could to make the bomb for Hitler, but failed, and 
after the war tried to white-wash himself. The situation became even worse in 1956 when the 
American journalist Robert Jungk published a book "Heller als tausend Sonnen" (Brighter 
Than a Thousand Suns) in which he described, greatly exaggerating, Heisenberg's satisfaction 
with the technical difficulties of bomb construction and the lack of enthusiasm for 
overcoming these difficulties, as a secret plan to prevent, for moral reasons, the construction 
of an atomic bomb for Hitler which otherwise he could have built. Heisenberg, and 
particularly von Weizsäcker, wrote letters to Robert Jungk in which, while appreciating 
Jungk's extensive research and detailed accounts of the developments, criticized some of his 
generalisations and exaggerations. Cathryn Carson, in her article “Reflexionen zu 
‘Kopenhagen’”, appended to the German edition of Frayn’s play “Copenhagen”, quotes from 
these letters. In the Danish translation of his book, which appeared in 1957, Jungk published 
an extraction of Heisenberg's letter, but only the laudatory part. It was known that Bohr took 
exception to Jungk's book which he had read in the Danish edition. Jungk's book, 
unfortunately, did much to harm Heisenberg's credibility, particularly as the wrong 
impression had arisen in some quarters that Heisenberg had commissioned it. Heisenberg was 
unaware of this. He never "portrayed himself after World War II as a kind of scientific 
resistance hero who sabotaged Hitler's efforts to build a nuclear weapon", as was suggested by 
James Glanz in The New York Times recently. Heisenberg always stressed how content he 
had been that nuclear weapons did not seem to be feasible for several years to come so that 
Hitler and his government made no efforts to build them when this had become clear to them. 
 
Meanwhile, all kinds of rumours circulated about the "real" motives behind Heisenberg's 1941 
visit to Bohr. It was suggested that he wanted to do some spying, to find out what Bohr knew 
about the nuclear efforts in the U.S. and Great Britain. It was suspected that Heisenberg 
wanted to enlist the support of Bohr for the German project. On the basis of some 
conversations which Heisenberg and von Weizsäcker had had with members of Bohr's 
institute there was also the version that the real reason for Heisenberg's visit was the intention 
to convince Bohr that Germany was going to win the war, that this outcome was desirable, 
and that Bohr had better end his unwillingness to cooperate with German authorities. It was 
generally held that the formerly cordial relationship between Bohr and Heisenberg was 
severely disturbed, if not severed, ever since. Few members of the international community 
knew that they continued to have friendly relations after the war, visiting each other, with 
their families, in their homes in Copenhagen and Göttingen, spending their vacations together 
in Greece, and that Bohr wrote an article for the Festschrift to Heisenberg's sixtieth birthday 
in 1961. 
 
When it became known that the Niels Bohr Archive in Copenhagen held a letter by Bohr to 
Heisenberg, written after the appearance of Jungk's book but never sent, speculation 
concentrated on this document, to be published 50 years after Bohr's death, i.e. in 2012, from 
which the solution of all the open questions was expected. However, to end speculation, the 
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Niels Bohr Archive released 11 documents pertaining to Heisenberg's visit, including the 
much-discussed unsent letter, preceded by an article by Aage Bohr, published in 1967, on 
"The War Years and the Prospects Raised by Atomic Weapons". The documents, with the 
exception of one letter written by Heisenberg to Bohr, are unfinished drafts written by Bohr in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, addressed to Heisenberg, but never sent. As the director of the 
Niels Bohr Archive, Finn Aaserud, points out, the documents have to be viewed with caution. 
They were written 16 years or more after the event and represent just drafts, not finished 
papers. Nevertheless, the contents of the documents are interesting and, depending on the pre-
established views and opinions of the readers of today, surprising to a lesser or greater degree. 
Here are some of the general characteristics of  the documents, with my comments in 
brackets: 
 
· Bohr's tone in addressing Heisenberg is extremely cordial and friendly. 
· Bohr was still highly interested in clarifying Heisenberg's intentions and motivations 
behind his 1941 visit. His sentences in Document 11 c "I have long been meaning to write 
to you ..." and "I have written in such length to make the case as clear as I can for you and 
hope we can talk in greater detail about this when opportunity arises" are proof of this. 
(This is new information. Heisenberg was under the impression that Bohr and he, having 
differing recollections of their discussion, had come to the conclusion that it would be best 
to let rest the spirits of the past. It is a pity that the letter was not sent. Several 
opportunities for clarifying conversations were missed at later meetings of Bohr and 
Heisenberg. It seems that Bohr was afraid he might hurt Heisenberg's feelings by insisting 
too much on his interpretation of the events.) 
· Document 1 contains the confirmation that Bohr and Heisenberg met several times during 
Heisenberg's visit to Copenhagen in 1941: Bohr refers to "our conversations" in the plural, 
and he mentions "our conversation in my room at the institute" as well as the strong 
impression Heisenberg's remarks made "on Margrethe and me". Since it is unlikely that 
Bohr's wife Margrethe was present at the confidential conversation in Bohr's room in the 
institute one may assume that Heisenberg's recollection is correct that he was also invited 
to Bohr's home. Moreover, there is Heisenberg's and von Weizsäcker's testimony that the 
critical discussion took place during a walk, to avoid unwanted earwitnesses.  
· Bohr was, at the time of the visit in 1941, highly distressed by the circumstances of 
Heisenberg's visit, his lecture at the German Culture Institute and  his contacts with the 
German Embassy (more correct: Legation) in Copenhagen. (Heisenberg had assumed 
Bohr would understand that without such contacts he would not have obtained visa and 
permission to enter occupied Denmark.) 
· Bohr understood and appreciated that one of Heisenberg's reasons for the visit was 
genuine care: to see how Bohr and his institute fared under German occupation and to be 
of assistance, if at all possible (Document 11 c).  
· For Bohr it was of central and sad significance that Heisenberg during his visit expressed 
his conviction of a German victory whereas Bohr, as a Danish patriot, had placed all his 
hopes in a German defeat. Since towards the end of the war Heisenberg's conviction must 
have disappeared, Bohr wondered whether Heisenberg, in retrospect, had forgotten or 
repressed his earlier views. (Again, for Heisenberg, mentioning the prospects for a 
German victory, was not central to his mission. At the beginning of the war he had, in 
private, expressed the view that Hitler would lose the war like a chess-player would lose a 
game into which he entered with one castle less than his opponent. However, after the 
surprisingly fast defeats of Poland and France, the occupation of large parts of Europe and 
the initial great victories and advances in the Soviet Union, with the U.S. still neutral, 
Heisenberg like most non-nazi Germans had come to the conclusion that a German victory 
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now seemed likely. They feared that a German defeat would mean Soviet occupation of 
Europe which, even for anti-nazis, was considered an even greater evil than German 
domination. Auschwitz and the full extent of nazi crimes was not yet known, but Stalin's 
massacres were. The hope - completely unrealistic as we now know but considered 
realistic at the time - was that after a German victory the German army would get rid of 
Hitler and his henchmen. The anti-nazi stance of many German generals, who later took 
part in the assassination plot of July 20, 1944, was known to persons who, like Heisenberg 
through the "Wednesday Society", were close to opposition circles. For Heisenberg, it was 
part of his care for Bohr to think in sober terms of the future and of Bohr's and his 
institute's survival. It would be advisable to end opposition to a victorious Germany. It is 
obvious that Heisenberg's assessment of Germany's chance to win the war must have 
changed a few months later when the U.S. entered the war and the German army suffered 
severe setbacks in Russia.) 
· Bohr mentions several times his reticence caused by his suspected surveillance by German 
police. (There is no indication of an awareness by Bohr that Heisenberg was under the 
same handicap. He had to be extremely cautious in choosing his language. Mentioning to 
Bohr the existence of a German nuclear programme and of his involvement in it, could be 
interpreted, and probably was, treason punishable by death. In public conversations, also 
in the cafeteria of Bohr's institute, he may have had to say things which did not represent 
his opinion. This situation is well-known to people having lived under cruel dictatorships.) 
· Document 6 says that Heisenberg "did not wish to enter into technical details but that 
Bohr should understand that he knew what he was talking about as he had spent 2 years 
working exclusively on this question." Bohr had known about the possibility of nuclear 
weapons only in a very general way and at that time still had held the opinion that the 
technical difficulties were insurmountable. Therefore Heisenberg found it necessary to 
mention his two years of investigations in order to convince Bohr that he was not "talking 
moonshine". Bohr had been "doubtful looking" (Document 11 a). 
· Bohr wondered (and this is new information) who had authorized Heisenberg to discuss 
with him military secrets. (Heisenberg had assumed Bohr would understand that he spoke 
in his private capacity as Bohr's old friend and colleague who, however, because of the 
delicacy of the subject discussed, had to use very involved language. Bohr, on the other 
hand, could not imagine that Heisenberg acted on his own initiative, without any special 
permission, let alone orders. But this was so. Heisenberg had thought, naively, that Bohr 
would be ready, as he always had been in earlier times, to discuss with him possible 
solutions for complicated problems. He had lacked the sensitivity for Bohr's patriotic 
feelings and misgivings under the changed circumstances of war and occupation. On the 
other hand, it is justified to say that it took great moral courage to talk to Bohr about 
implications of his secret work. Heisenberg risked his neck.) 
· Constant German propaganda talks of the imminent use of "new weapons" fortified 
suspicions by Bohr and his Danish colleagues that there was a German nuclear bomb 
programme. Assertions by Jensen to the contrary were not trusted though he himself was 
considered honest. But Jensen was working on the reactor programme, and it had to be 
doubted that he was privy to all aspects of the programme.  
· After Bohr's escape to Sweden and subsequent flight to Great Britain in the autumn of 
1943 "it was quite clear already then, on the basis of intelligence reports, that there was no 
possibility of carrying out such a large undertaking in Germany before the end of the 
war". (Document 11 b). This is a remarkable confirmation of Heisenberg's own 
conclusion. It is also interesting that these intelligence reports had no influence on the 
progress of the Manhattan project. 
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· Aage Bohr writes "After the outbreak of war and especially after the occupation of 
Denmark we in Copenhagen were completely cut off from following the allied nations' 
efforts in the field of atomic energy." Niels Bohr confirms this in Document 11 c. (Also 
Heisenberg knew that. How could he expect to do some spying, as some writers have 
suggested?) In a footnote to his article Aage Bohr assures the reader that no secret plan 
was submitted to his father by Heisenberg "aimed at preventing the development of 
atomic weapons through a mutual agreement with colleagues in the allied countries." 
Again, in Document 11 c, this is what Bohr remembers. It is quite true, also according to 
Heisenberg. It had indeed been Heisenberg's intention to get Bohr's opinion on 
possibilities for such an agreement or on other ways out of the impasse presented by the 
basic feasibility of atomic weapons. But Heisenberg never had a chance to present his 
questions because of Bohr's reticence and Bohr's unwillingness to continue the 
conversation when Heisenberg, as an introduction, had told Bohr that atomic weapons 
were technically possible, and that he knew it. He was not even allowed to add, as he had 
intended, that the technology was very difficult and would take a long time, thereby 
giving the small international community of atomic scientists a chance to use their 
influence in the meantime. Bohr had stopped listening. This is admitted by Bohr in 
Document 11 c where he writes "During the conversation, which because of my cautious 
attitude was only brief ...".   
 
 
 
 
New insights 
 
